Introduction : Kant and Sartre – existentialism and critical philosophy by Head, Jonathan et al.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Head, Jonathan, Tomaschewska, Anna, Bojanowski, Jochen , Vanzo, Alberto and Baiasu, 
Sorin (2016) Introduction : Kant and Sartre – existentialism and critical philosophy. In: 
Baiasu, Sorin , (ed.) Comparing Kant and Sartre. Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York : 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3-17. ISBN 9781137454522 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/78664                      
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Jonathan Head, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo and Sorin Baiasu, 
Introduction - Kant and Sartre : Existentialism and Critical Philosophy, 2016, Palgrave 
MacMillan, reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. 
'This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The 
definitive, published, version of record is available here: 
http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137454522  
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URLl’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
1 | P a g e  
 
Introduction 
Kant and Sartre: Existentialism and Critical Philosophy∗ 
Jonathan Head, Anna Tomaszewska, Jochen Bojanowski, Alberto Vanzo and Sorin Baiasu 
  
Published in Comparing Kant and Sartre, edited by Sorin Baiasu 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 3-17. 
 
1. Kant and Sartre So Far 
Kant and Sartre are two of the most significant figures in modern philosophy, and yet there has, until 
very recently, been little comparative research undertaken on them. Despite dealing with many 
shared philosophical issues, they have traditionally been taken to be too opposed to each other to 
render any search for possible parallels between their works a useful enterprise. Indeed, Sartre is 
often taken to be one of Kant’s most vocal critics in the literature, and as rather indebted to other 
major figures, such as Husserl and Heidegger. As a consequence, often, where comparative analysis 
has been done upon Kant and Sartre, the emphasis has been on their differences, rather than on 
their similarities. However, as recent research has begun to show, the story is not that 
straightforward and there is much to be explored with regard to parallels between Kant and Sartre. 
Baiasu (2003) has characterised Sartre’s relation to Kant as one of an “anxiety of influence” – Sartre 
desires to explicitly distance himself from Kant, but this obscures some deeper underlying parallels 
between them1. Such parallels can form a foundation for productive dialogue, more widely, between 
the schools of Kantian “Critical philosophy” and existentialism2. 
 
Recent research has demonstrated the possibility of such a dialogue between the philosophies of 
Kant and Sartre. A natural starting-point for comparative analysis of both philosophers is that of 
their ethical theories, which has sparked differences of opinion amongst scholars. Linsenbard (2007), 
for example, has argued that Sartre’s use of Kantian notions (such as a principle of universalizability) 
masks more fundamental differences between the two that place them far apart:  
 
[I]t would be a mistake, I think, to interpret Sartre’s views on morality as ‘Kantian’ or as 
even marginally endorsing Kant’s views. Indeed, Sartre’s continuing preoccupation (one 
might even say ‘obsession’) with Kant suggests… a path he did not wish to take with 
respect to the most promising moral terrain (2007: 65).  
 
Due to having radically different ethical theories, despite much talk of Kant and use of familiarly 
Kantian language, Sartre “cannot… be interpreted as invoking Kant’s meaning” (2007: 80). Painter 
(1999) on the other hand finds deep similarities between Kant and Sartre on the questions of ethics, 
                                                          
∗ Acknowledgement SB: Work on this paper was carried out while an Honorary Guest Research Professor at 
the University of Vienna, as part of the ERC Advanced Research Project “Distortions of Normativity”. I am 
grateful to the project’s PI for making this possible. 
1 Howells (1986) originally made this point with regard to their respective positions on ethics, which Baiasu 
(2011) later expanded to cover wider aspects of their philosophies. 
2 An example of such a dialogue can be seen in the work of Christine Korsgaard, who explicitly acknowledges 
her indebtedness to both Kant and Sartre. Whilst her work is more widely recognised as Kantian in spirit, 
nevertheless it also includes strong existentialist aspects. 
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identifying a shared inheritance in the tradition of Protestant ethics. Describing Sartre’s relationship 
with Kant as “flirtatious”, he writes that  
 
[b]oth find a common ground in a fundamental aspect of the Protestant ethic, 
characterized by Lutheranism and Calvinism, wherein the everyday takes on great moral 
significance, and great deeds, or high moral principles that direct actions based on the 
actualization of virtuous ends become hubristic, impious and immoral… how we 
approach the simply given in life, the concrete everyday situation, has far more moral 
significance than any moral principle whose content defines what is right or what is 
wrong (1999: 211).  
 
Given this shared inheritance, we can see Sartre’s use of Kant’s language and various concepts as an 
opportunity to illuminate ethical insights from the Protestant ethical tradition, alongside his own 
idiosyncratic developments, and Sartre himself as unable to escape from shared parallels with Kant 
on the question of ethics: “Sartre’s critique of Kant’s ethics, and his attempt to develop his own, 
burns down, like a crucible, the essence of both approaches: a secular Protestantism” (1999: 217). 
 
As part of the project of a comparative analysis on Kant’s and Sartre’s ethical works, Sweeney (1985) 
has also noted that, in his short story “The Wall”, Sartre uses examples similar to those of Kant’s 
famous essay “On a Supposed Right to Lie From Philanthropy”, which illuminate the ethical theses 
that he is attempting to illustrate through the narrative3. We see, in this story, Sartre potentially 
using Kantian resources to argue against Husserl; as Sweeney writes, “Sartre seeks to argue against 
Husserl by presenting through his use of Kant’s example a counter-example to Husserl’s view” (1985: 
15). Though, of course, this in itself does not show that Sartre is adopting a Kantian ethical theory, it 
does illustrate at least that he was aware of the philosophical resources made available to him by 
Kant for use in describing and elaborating his own ethical theory.  
 
Lieberman (1997) has also added to this literature by comparing Kant and Sartre’s accounts of 
freedom, particularly taking into account the impact that radical evil has upon freedom in Religion 
within the Bounds of Mere Reason. An interesting parallel can perhaps be seen between the choice 
of a fundamental ethical disposition as an original act of will (which, as far as Kant is concerned, 
makes all human beings radically evil) and Sartre’s notion of ‘choosing oneself’ – both are choices 
which are independent of the individual’s environment, are “outside of time”, and serve as an 
intelligible ground for individual choices, seeing them as part of a “total choice” (1997: 210-212).  
 
However, Lieberman is keen to note that the parallels between Kant and Sartre on the notion of a 
kind of fundamental ethical choice only go so far; ultimately they differ insofar as “first, Sartre lacks 
the world view that accepts common (and perhaps unquestionable) knowledge of the moral law; 
and second, Sartre lacks the theoretical orientation in which an a priori awareness of the moral law 
is possible – in which a fact about our essence as rational beings precedes, or is at least independent 
of, our existence – thereby reversing the existential canon that existence precedes essence” (1997: 
215). Nevertheless, he speaks of the comparative analysis of Kant and Sartre on this issue as 
                                                          
3 Though, Sweeney does allow that Sartre could have been inspired to use this example by Plato or Victor Hugo 
(1985: 16 n7). 
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“fruitful” in “revealing in the residue of analysis an historical trace that connects Kant to Sartre in 
some aspects of their thought”, as well as “[bringing] to light fundamental problems within their 
theories and [suggesting] avenues of interpretation and possible solutions” (1997: 216). 
 
Other recent research has focused on issues in the theoretical philosophies of Kant and Sartre. Deep 
parallels and dissimilarities have both been noted. As an example, Jopling (1986) has discussed their 
accounts of self-knowledge (a topic that will recur in this volume). A deep affinity can be found in the 
sense in which the attempt to gain self-knowledge, for both philosophers, is a very difficult 
endeavour indeed: 
 
Kant and Sartre, I believe, are calling attention to the existence of a blind spot which 
unavoidably insinuates itself into all our attempts to know ourselves. The activities 
necessary for self-knowledge… are always one logical step behind themselves, and are 
blind to the very agency constitutive of and contemporaneous with them. We are 
unable to know ourselves in the very act of knowing… We know ourselves through the 
categories, or through the ‘Other’ – and not as absolutely proximate and self-present 
(1986: 74).  
 
Sartre follows Kant’s approach in seeking “to correct the strong tendency towards reification and 
substantialization which infects… both philosophical and pre-philosophical self-knowing activities” 
(1986: 75) and holding a “radicalized version of the concept of constituting activity” (1986: 73) that 
ultimately denies straightforward knowledge of the self. More recently, Darnell (2005 – a 
contributor to this volume) has also published a monograph on the notion of self in Kant and Sartre, 
noting the complex relations between the two on this topic, and that Sartre’s misreading of Kant 
may have led him to distance himself from Kantian thought more than he needed to; for example, 
“he most likely fell victim to Kant’s characterization of the I of apperception as not only a unity, but 
also as a ground of identity” (2005: 27). Also as part of this body of research on theoretical 
philosophy, Gardner has recently considered the extent to which Sartre can be labelled a 
“transcendental philosopher”. He paints a complex picture of the position of Sartre in the post-
Kantian tradition, but nevertheless argues that in a substantial sense Sartre can be seen as following 
a Kantian line in some of his theoretical thinking. As an example, Gardner points to Sartre’s “anti-
naturalist strategy” as being “at least in substantial part, transcendental” (2011: 54) due to the use 
of recognisably transcendental argumentation. 
 
Of course, there is much more literature now available as part of the growing body of research on 
Kant and Sartre – these have been merely examples to give at least a limited sense of the wealth of 
research opportunities available in comparing these two philosophers. This volume of original essays 
is intended to be a significant addition to the growing body of comparative research on Kant and 
Sartre, encompassing in an unprecedented manner a number of original papers that embrace many 
philosophical topics of interest shared between the two thinkers. Many of the papers stem from a 
conference on Kant and Sartre held at Keele University in November 2012. The volume, split into 
three major parts, addresses issues in metaphysics, metaethics, and metaphilosophy. Philosophical 
notions central to both Kant and Sartre, including autonomy, happiness, self-consciousness, self-
knowledge, evil, temporality and the imagination are explored in great detail to give us a clearer 
picture of the theoretical and practical philosophies of both thinkers. In addition to giving us new 
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insights, the papers also leave many unanswered questions, and thus give us promising prospects for 
future comparative research on Kant and Sartre. The rest of this Introduction will discuss some of 
the key points of the papers in the order in which they appear in the volume, as well as the issues 
and difficulties they raise for future research. 
 
2. Comparing Kant and Sartre 
2.1. Metaphysics 
The volume proper begins with a contribution by Sorin Baiasu, who considers two objections 
generated by his claim that Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception is deeply similar to Sartre’s 
(self-)consciousness or pre-reflective consciousness of self. Both objections are prompted by 
Baiasu’s claim that Sartrean pre-reflective consciousness of self and Kantian transcendental unity of 
apperception play the role of a weak epistemological condition of experience. The first objection 
indirectly challenges the weakness of such a condition, whereas the second disputes its 
epistemological nature. The first objection is said to have implications for the current debate 
concerning non-conceptual content, whereas the second is regarded as linked to traditional debates 
concerning the kind of idealism that Critical philosophy and phenomenology offer. After a brief 
discussion concerning some methodological problems for comparative philosophical studies, the 
chapter answers the two objections and examines their implications.  
 
However, the weak sense of personality important to Baiasu’s argument here, that is, the 
epistemological condition offered by the transcendental unity of apperception, which is necessary in 
a practical, moral sense, raises questions. We can reflect, for example, upon a shift in Kant’s thought 
between the first and second editions of the first Critique; in the former, Kant denies knowledge of 
substance in a thick sense, although he seems to allow that we may be substances in a thin, logical 
sense, whereas in the latter, he denies even this sort of thin knowledge of ourselves as substances. It 
would perhaps be an interesting line of future research to evaluate how a comparison with Sartre 
might shift if we concentrate on the differing first and second editions of the first Critique. 
Furthermore, questions can be raised as to whether there is in fact a notion of a weak sense of 
personality in the A edition4. Such uncertainty regarding Kant’s position further complicates the 
issue of how we compare his commitments in the first Critique with Sartre’s pre-reflective 
consciousness of self. 
 
Continuing on the theme of the conditions of our experience, Daniel Herbert’s paper focuses on the 
topic of temporality. He argues that a fundamental misunderstanding of transcendental idealism as 
involving an ontological commitment to a supersensible reality leads Sartre to make unfair criticisms 
of Kant’s treatment of temporality. If we opt for an Allison-style ‘methodological’ or ‘two-aspects’ 
reading of transcendental idealism (where we refrain from stating that the objects of experience are 
ideal, even if space and time are), we can see that Sartre’s criticisms regarding the linking of 
temporality to the perspective of a transcendental subject are perhaps ill-founded. However, it is not 
clear that traditional worries concerning the Kantian use of the thing-in-itself are avoided under the 
two-aspects model, for if the forms of intuition are ideal, and intuition is supposed to provide 
evidence for the reality of sensible objects, then we have the worry that sensible intuitions 
themselves and the ‘reality’ of the objects are ideal too.  
                                                          
4 Ameriks has argued that some interpreters are mistaken in ascribing personality to the ‘I’ (2000: esp. Ch. 4). 
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Nevertheless, Herbert further reflects upon where the two philosophers diverge with regard to 
temporality; whereas Kant’s account is more impersonal, Sartre desires to ground his understanding 
of temporality in everyday experience, in particular through our capacity for spontaneity, and not 
making a distinction between a transcendental ‘extra-mundane’ subjectivity and its empirical 
counterpart. Kant’s overemphasis on the mathematical sciences leads him, in Sartre’s view, to posit 
an unacceptably strong distinction between the empirical and the noumenal. Whilst Sartre 
recognises the relevance of temporality in all domains of human activity, Kant seems to limit this to 
the domain of science alone.  
 
The discussion opens up further directions for research; for instance, we can examine whether 
Sartre’s interpretation of Kant on temporality, the foundation on which he forms his objections, is 
accurate. What seems objectionable is that Sartre sees Kant’s theory of time as relevant to a theory 
of science but not at the same time to a theory of mind and human cognition. Yet, in fact, Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy and his account of time can be read as (part of) a theory of the conditions 
of the possibility of science (e.g. Vleeschauwer 1962) or a theory of mind and cognition (e.g. Kitcher 
1990) or a theory of experience (e.g. Aquila 1983). The point is that Kant’s account of time has been 
read in more ‘phenomenological’ ways, too, and that for comparing him Kant Sartre this could prove 
fruitful. 
 
With Thomas Flynn’s contribution, we turn from temporality to the imaginary. His paper reflects 
upon Kant’s influence on Sartre’s psychology, with a particular emphasis on the imagination. Flynn 
works through a number of Sartre’s works, noting potentially illuminating parallels between the two 
philosophers. As an example, the young Sartre seemed to have been enamoured with the role that 
the imagination has to play in the Critique of Judgement, along with Kant’s use of symbolic 
schematism. Flynn also notes points where Sartre seems to have been spurred by Kant to develop 
certain aspects of his own philosophy, such as with the notion of an ‘egoless’ consciousness, the 
placing of the imaging consciousness at the very centre of his philosophical psychology, and the 
appeal to the ‘as if’ in expanding our imaginary reflections upon philosophical issues (in a parallel 
with Kantian regulative ideas). The paper concludes with reflections upon the parallels and tensions 
between Sartre’s later ethics and Kantian moral theory.  
 
There are open questions here regarding the distance between Kant and Sartre, and indeed whether 
the latter sees himself as attacking the former. Flynn argues that the ‘egoless’ consciousness forms 
part of Sartre’s attack on Kant, alongside intentionality and a realist epistemology, posed against 
Kant’s constitutive character of consciousness. Is Sartre simply interested in different questions than 
Kant, and can we construe Kant along Sartrean lines, with himself adopting intentionality and a 
realist epistemology? Is the Kantian constitutive character of consciousness so unamenable to 
Sartre? 
 
The part of the volume on metaphysics concludes with a paper by Christian Onof on the key 
metaphysical notions of freedom and the self in Kant and Sartre. More specifically, Onof attempts to 
use philosophical resources from Sartre to aid Kant with his problem of reconciling transcendental 
freedom with causal determinism in the Third Antinomy. This account appears to leave us with 
something of a dilemma with regards to the possibility of evil – if we assume that to be free means 
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to be moral, then one can only be evil if one is not free, and hence not responsible for their evil 
actions. (Perhaps we could attempt to resolve the dilemma by allowing for different types of 
freedom in addition to autonomy, which is a presupposition for being free). We can fill out our 
understanding of Kant’s views on these points by noting his distinction between Wille (practical 
reason under the moral law) and Willkür (the legislative – transcendentally free – power of choice). 
However, we may still wonder how Willkür chooses noumenally, particularly when it does not 
legislate in accordance with the moral law.  
 
Onof suggests that Sartre’s ontology of the “For-Itself” and the “In-Itself” can aid Kant here in placing 
spontaneity outside of being, and considers whether this could aid with the potential difficulty that 
God’s creative act could predetermine our actions. However, Sartre’s account leads to an emphasis 
on consciousness as the source of negation in a way that the Kantian would resist. Instead, Onof 
concludes with the suggestion of a modal realist interpretation of transcendental idealism in order 
to maintain normativity as being connected to what is possible. He also argues that this position is 
compatible with Kantian moral theory.  
 
The paper raises many questions, as well as tapping into a wider debate (seen in a number of 
contributions to this volume) regarding how dissimilar Sartre’s “realist” ontology is from Kantian 
transcendental idealism. As an example, we could consider what “outside” means with regard to the 
For-Itself’s lying outside of the fullness of the being of the In-Itself. A natural reading would be to 
take ‘outside’ as denoting ontological distinctness, but what kind of distinctness this could be, given 
that ‘outside’ of being is outside of ontology itself, is a further question to be considered. In relation 
to this, how are we to understanding “nothing” in a Sartrean context? Is it absolute, in denoting 
there not being anything, or merely relative, as a positive something with a specific role to play in 
Sartre’s philosophy? Indeed, how are we to understand more generally the status of such claims 
regarding what is beyond being? We may also raise questions about Kant, for example, whether the 
notions of substance and causation (both a priori concepts of the understanding) should both be 
modified when faced with the difficulties of accounting for freedom, instead of merely shifting to a 
different notion of causation. 
 
2.2. Metaethics 
In the following part of the volume, our attention moves from metaphysics to metaethics, beginning 
with Leslie Stevenson’s essay on self-knowledge and its relation to freedom in Kant and Sartre. 
Stevenson begins by reflecting upon the Sartrean “pre-reflective cogito”, which bears more than a 
passing resemblance to the Kantian ‘I think’ of the transcendental unity of apperception. Using a 
contrast with animal mentality, he argues that both Kant and Sartre seem to have a sense that 
human beings can have conceptualized perceptions that are unavailable to other animals, such that 
we can become “positionally” aware of ourselves in relation to our environment and explicitly aware 
of other facts about ourselves. In this regard, Stevenson utilises the pure/impure reflection 
distinction in Sartre to suggest that we could understand such self-awareness as a kind of “purifying” 
reflection upon our own fundamental purposes. Finally, the paper concludes by arguing for a deep 
parallel between Kant and Sartre on the question of self-knowledge in relation to freedom, in that, 
for both, self-knowledge (in whatever way you wish to construe it) and project-setting can act in 
tandem.  
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Further reflections upon Sartre’s account of self-knowledge could focus on the claim, in The 
Transcendence of the Ego, that non-reflective consciousness is an impersonal, transcendental field of 
consciousness. If such an impersonal consciousness is the basis for reflective as well as positional 
consciousness, then can reflective consciousness be said to be personal? It becomes difficult to see 
how self-knowledge comes from reflective consciousness, given that, according to the early Sartre, it 
provides an ego that is part of the world and thus not part of a person’s consciousness. The 
approach of comparing human and animal consciousness in Kant and Sartre is also promising, 
though poses further questions. One such question revolves around how we should distinguish 
animal and human consciousness in the context of Sartre’s various commitments regarding 
consciousness. We may think that animals should not be attributed pre-reflective cogito because the 
human pre-reflective consciousness of self is what allows us to reflect upon our actions in a way that 
other animals do not. However, is this enough to deny pre-reflective cogito to animal consciousness, 
particularly if we may want to grant them pre-reflective positional consciousness, which (according 
to Sartre) rests upon a pre-reflective consciousness of self? Drawing the lines between human and 
animal consciousness in this way, within the confines of Sartre’s philosophy, is certainly a research 
direction worth pursuing. 
 
Peter Poellner’s paper focuses upon autonomy in Sartre’s philosophy, with a view to drawing lessons 
for contemporary debates surrounding practical rationality. To begin with, he explores the Sartrean 
view of seeing autonomy as tied to a consciousness being both self-determining and sensitive to 
reasons. Poellner delineates a number of aspects of Sartre’s account of freedom, and argues that 
these do not have direct metaphysical import, but rather refer to phenomenological facts, to a 
“practical reality of action”. Under this view, autonomy can be seen as the very foundation of an 
“ethics of freedom”, and there a possible parallel with Kant lies. He further reflects upon Sartre’s 
“completion thesis”. Sartre appears to have taken this thesis to have had a certain amount of 
ontological import, stating that, in pursuing ends, consciousness experiences a lack and feels 
‘incomplete’ in a sense. Thus, a corollary of action is a desire on the part of consciousness to 
complete itself, and overcome the lack that it has previously felt. Poellner, having undertaken a 
certain amount of “rational reconstruction”, evaluates this “quasi-Sartrean” view and finds it 
somewhat wanting in its obscurity. Nevertheless, he thinks we can formulate a sufficiently filled-out 
view such that we can evaluate it in comparison with Kantian ethical theory. In particular, with the 
notion of a consciousness’ having value insofar as it aims at unqualifiedly valuable ends, a value that 
potentially encompasses all conscious beings, we may be reminded of the Kantian quest for the 
summum bonum, or the “highest good”. 
 
Poellner’s paper suggests a further avenue of research when he distinguishes between 
fundamentally value-centred and reasons-centred views, with Sartre falling under the former 
umbrella and Kant under the latter. Does this distinction show a fundamental discontinuity between 
the two philosophers? It is especially noteworthy that Kant’s ethical theory is, in a sense, value-
centred, taking good and evil not as values to be derived from normatively neutral features, but in 
fact as a priori ideas of reason, as we can see from the second Critique. 
 
Justin Alam’s contribution focuses upon two key concepts in the metaethics of Kant and Sartre: 
respectively, radical evil and bad faith. In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant 
introduces the notion of a “supreme maxim”, chosen 
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morally good or amoral incentives in selecting first-order maxims of action. It is in the selection of an 
evil supreme maxim that radical evil consists. Alam examines how we can understand the selection 
of an evil supreme maxim given that we have an overriding reason, following from our autonomy, to 
choose a good supreme maxim. In order to unpick this difficulty, he draws upon the possibility of 
self-deception playing a part in the selection of a supreme maxim. However, self-deception itself 
brings problems with it, such as how we can at the same time both know and be ignorant about a 
given deception.  
 
It is at this point that Sartrean bad faith comes into the picture. As a way of undermining the 
difficulties surrounding the notion of self-deception, it provides the possibility of a situation in which 
an individual does not simultaneously believe one thing and its opposite, but rather distracts 
themselves from the truth by misinterpreting evidence for it. On this basis, Alam assesses the 
possibility of a Kantian use of this sort of strategy to make sense of the choice of the “supreme 
maxim”.  The idea of a will choosing a fundamental disposition on the basis of reasons, for example, 
may still retain an air of mystery (indeed, it may seem that Kant accepted that evil actions are 
ultimately unintelligible).  
 
It is suggested that a kind of “false freedom” is the promise upon which we decide to prioritise self-
love, but the possibility remains that the choice of freedom is more fundamental than the choice to 
prioritise self-love on Kant’s model; or perhaps we are putting things the wrong way around, for 
freedom has a secondary value to the good: freedom makes the universal agreement of all rational 
beings possible, but it is the good that is the object of pure practical cognition. Self-deception itself, 
though, may also remain a wholly intractable problem. There is still a level of pretence involved in 
bad faith, contrasted with a sincerity condition required for true belief. Thus, we have a notion of an 
individual non-sincerely pretending something to be the case, which ultimately may remain just as 
mysterious as the idea of an individual simultaneously believing in one thing and in its opposite. All 
these questions foreshadow interesting avenues for future research. 
 
The metaethical part of the volume concludes with Michelle Darnell’s analysis of the role of 
happiness in Kant and Sartre, which she argues could play a larger part in the philosophy of both 
thinkers than is usually supposed. According to Darnell, Sartre criticises Kantian ethics on the basis 
that it is not a positive ethics; being grounded in a noumenal realm, it is too far removed from the 
level of concrete events. However, Kant can offer a positive ethics drawing upon the notion of 
happiness, and the importance of interdependence of persons in creating value in the world, with 
the end-result of summum bonum, where happiness is established in proportion to virtue. Once we 
understand this positive aspect of Kant’s ethics, which involves a teleological dimension of the 
unification of all moral ends, we can see that Sartre’s criticisms are largely unfounded. In stressing 
this positive aspect of Kant’s ethics, though, have we moved away from the key Kantian emphasis on 
autonomy?  
 
In response to Sartre’s objections, it seems promising to make the highest good into a social good 
upon which we ground principles of action. There is a danger, though, that if we make happiness in 
proportion to virtue a moral principle, we may be placing a fundamentally heteronomous principle 
at the heart of Kant’s ethics, and if so, sacrificing a part of his ethics that makes it identifiably 
Kantian. Do we, in replying to Sartre’s objections, grant him too much? Further, Darnell goes on to 
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consider a possible role for happiness in Sartre’s ethics. At first, it seems that such a role may be 
entirely negative as an expression of bad faith, marking out a means by which we seek to deny our 
own existence as for-itself. The beginnings of a possible positive role for happiness comes through a 
link to authenticity, in which our understanding of happiness can undergo a revolution, becoming a 
feeling of joy in response to the authentic person’s free creation of a meaningful world. Thus, 
perhaps a deeper relation, grounded in a fundamentally optimistic attitude, can be found between 
Kant and Sartre, though questions regarding the kind of happiness that both philosophers have in 
mind remain. Sartre’s view of happiness as consisting in an authentic life seems more akin to a Stoic 
model than the view held by Kant.  
 
2.3. Metaphilosophy 
The final part of the volume deals with metaphilosophical issues, beginning with a paper by 
Katherine Morris on the possibility of reading Sartre as a “philosophical therapist”, along the lines of 
Wittgenstein. The paper, amongst other things, focuses on Sartre’s practice of giving descriptions of 
everyday experiences, and using such descriptions as springboard for reflections upon the 
phenomenology of human reality. Adopting a therapeutic approach involves moving from 
descriptions of experience to phenomenological claims in a way that breaks down resistance to such 
descriptions due to bad faith. Such an approach stands in contrast to what she calls a 
“transcendental reading”, in which transcendental arguments are used in order to demonstrate that 
phenomenological claims are conditions for the possibility of certain kinds of experience. Through 
the examination of examples given by Sartre concerning the phenomenology of everyday 
experiences, Morris argues that the descriptions involved are not incontestable such that they can 
stand as a foundation for a transcendental argument; rather, Sartre can be read as concerned with 
bad faith as willing to misconstrue phenomenological ontology through resisting certain descriptions 
of experience. In this regard, we can draw upon Wittgenstein, who attempts to use philosophy to 
dispel intellectual prejudice, as difficult as that task may be.  
 
Morris ends her paper by answering possible objections to a therapeutic reading of Sartre. One such 
objection is that Sartre, on this reading, has left behind philosophical argumentation entirely, and 
another connected objection is that in this way Sartre has decisively left epistemological issues 
aside. Such objections can be met, Morris argues, through reflections upon Sartre’s specific target on 
individuals with bad faith. This discussion, in turn, certainly invites further questions regarding Kant, 
for example, whether we could attempt to interpret Kant along therapeutic lines.5 As a starting-point 
for such reflection, Morris notes the impact the therapeutic reading has on the distinction between 
appearance and reality. The transcendental reading assumes that the distinction in question maps 
onto a gap that needs to be bridged, whereas the therapeutic reading paints Sartre as undermining 
the “scandal of philosophy” that is the difficulties surrounding an inference from appearance to 
reality. If a therapeutic reading of Kant proves successful, would this affect our evaluation of the 
relation between Kant and Sartre?  
 
The volume concludes with a consideration of transcendental idealism in Kant and Sartre by Richard 
Aquila. He argues that both philosophers espouse a form of transcendental idealism called 
“transcendental phenomenalism”, in which a judgement of an appearance as “real” involves both, 
                                                          
5 This is a line taken by Graham Bird (for instance, 2007). 
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from one point of view, affirming the appearance as phenomenon and, from another, affirming that 
it is an appearance within an infinite series of appearances of the phenomenon involved. Such a 
similarity is possible, if one construes transcendental idealism more generally as stating of a “real” 
phenomenon that a judgement is being made of a consciously-available object whose ontological 
status is left open. An empirical judgement requires an appeal to being-in-itself in addition to an 
appeal to infinity with regard to those species of appearances to which the objects in question are 
reducible. The appeal to being-in-itself, however, is not to be considered as regarding said objects as 
things-in-themselves from a transcendental perspective. It is through such parallels that Kant and 
Sartre can be seen as holding similar positions.  
 
Nevertheless differences between Kant and Sartre remain, such as, for example, surrounding the 
distinction between the Kantian “thing-in-itself” and the Sartrean “being-in-itself”. Aquila’s paper 
invites deeper metaphilosophical questions regarding the framework within which we compare Kant 
and Sartre. How are we to deal with technical terms like phenomena and appearance within the 
framework of different philosophies? Taking appearance and phenomena as our example, not only 
might Kant and Sartre mean different things by these terms, but also the relationship between the 
two terms may differ, making any fruitful comparison between the two on these issues very difficult 
indeed. Further research of such issues is invited here. 
 
3. Conclusion 
So, to conclude, what questions and possible future avenues for research do these papers raise? To 
begin with, we can consider wider issues surrounding the kind of comparative analysis undertaken 
here, particularly when one philosopher (in this case, Sartre) is consciously reacting to another 
(Kant). In such a situation, not only do we have to attend to varying competing interpretations of the 
positive philosophies of both figures, but we also have to be careful in placing the later philosopher’s 
interpretation of the earlier philosopher amongst these various options. In the case of Kant and 
Sartre, a comparative analysis of these two philosophers may be very illuminating, and in particular 
may help to clarify various aspects of Sartre’s philosophy and how he sees his own position in the 
history of philosophy. However, we may be misled if we are not clear on the question of which 
interpretation of Kant he is reacting to, a factor which would be crucial for any successful 
comparative analysis. Indeed, does it matter if Sartre is unfair to Kant, or if he is a perceptive, 
sensitive reader of him?  
 
In addition to such an endeavour, we may still desire to compare Kant and Sartre on their own 
terms, regardless of how the latter interpreted the former, but we must be clear that this is an 
entirely separate issue. Further reflection could take place on which approach we find the most 
useful for our philosophical research – there may be a substantive difference between the two, they 
may complement each other very well, or it may just be a matter of taste, with differing aims for 
research in the history of philosophy. In addition to this, a number of papers in this volume have 
attempted reconstructive work on the philosophies of Kant and Sartre in light of the contrasts and 
parallels between the two. However, this raises the question of how far we should go with such 
reconstructive work, and whether there is a point at which we lose something essential from the 
philosophy that is being reconstructed. There is perhaps a point in which we should leave a 
philosophy as it is, despite the difficulties it faces, in order to preserve unique insights that we may 
wish to plunder for our own philosophical needs. 
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Leaving methodological issues aside, these papers have also raised a number of issues pertaining 
specifically to comparative research on Kant and Sartre. One general question we may wonder about 
is the extent to which Kant can be viewed as a kind of ‘proto-existentialist’, or if that is too much, the 
extent to which the existentialists draw crucial insights from specifically Kant’s thought (as opposed 
to Kantian thought more generally). In addition, there are important metaphilosophical questions to 
answer regarding how Kant and Sartre both regard the aims and methods of their philosophies. To 
take an example, Kant’s project in the Critical period is very carefully constructed (and rather 
idiosyncratic) to respond to specific issues in philosophy at that time, a situation that had certainly 
moved on by the early 20th century. Is there a sufficient amount of crossover between Kant and 
Sartre on the question of metaphilosophy to substantiate substantive conclusions through 
comparative analysis? Or, are there simply fundamental discontinuities between these two 
philosophers on these key issues?  
 
Such worries also impact upon any attempt to focus on specific topics within their philosophies – for 
example, if one philosopher’s treatment of freedom has very different aims and methods than 
another philosopher’s account, then it will be very difficult to make secure, substantive comparative 
points on that topic. Nevertheless, the papers in this volume show that, despite difficulties, much 
can be done in comparative research of Kant and Sartre. The two philosophers do have a great deal 
to say to each other, as well as to us. In conversation, they not only illuminate aspects of the 
philosophy of their interlocutor but also parts of their own. Doubtless, this conversation will 
continue in future research with a great amount of success. 
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